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INTRODUCTION 
The shutdown of the United States government for sixteen days in October 
2013 symbolized a distinctively American version of political failure. Failure 
is, of course, not uncommon in the lifecycles of modern constitutional 
government. Between 2010 and 2011, Belgium spent more than 530 days 
without an elected government, due to a political gridlock between politicians 
from the Flemish-speaking North and the French-speaking South.1 And 
between 2006 and 2013, Canada’s Parliament was suspended four times at the 
Prime Minister’s request, amounting to a stoppage of 181 days.2 The United 
States, Belgium, and Canada are mature constitutional democracies, not the 
transitional democracies whose susceptibility to failure might be a more 
predictable and obvious concern.3 But the U.S. government shutdown was 
itself exceptional. The institutional impasse experienced in the United States 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. With thanks to Richard 
Albert, Yasmin Dawood, Brian Galle, Lisa Owens, Vlad Perju, Jim Rogers, Adam Shinar, 
Mark Tushnet, and the research assistance of Lauren Hazday and Colette Irving. 
1 Belgium’s New Government: An End to Waffle?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2011, at 66. 
2 Steven Chase, Harper Delays Commons by a Month, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Sept. 13, 
2013, at A11. See generally PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS (Peter H. Russell & 
Lorne Sossin eds., 2009). 
3 For an attempt to categorize the relevant differences, see Ran Hirschl, Dysfunctional? 
Dissonant? Démodé? America’s Constitutional Woes in Comparative Perspective, 94 B.U. 
L. REV. 939, 939-40 (2014) (arguing that while the United States may have constitutional 
problems, such problems pale in comparison to the constitutional problems the majority of 
states face). 
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did not cause the legislature itself to shut down – such as occurred in Ottawa – 
or give rise to a caretaker government – such as in Brussels. Instead the U.S. 
deadlock resulted in a shutdown of all government services deemed 
“nonessential”;4 the suspension of certain government contracts; and a merry-
go-round of standoffs between the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
and the President and the House Speaker. 
In this Article, I focus on the U.S. shutdown as a notable – and peculiarly 
American – version of political dysfunction. In part this is because what makes 
the shutdown noteworthy is the precarious line between fiscal competence and 
fiscal peril – and between political leverage and political blackmail – that 
became apparent in October 2013. These lines were crossed, as a result of 
political impasse, for a number of vulnerable groups, who were unable to 
access government services when Congress refused to pass an appropriations 
bill for the 2014 fiscal year. Of course precariousness would have been all the 
more prevalent had Congress not passed legislation to raise the debt ceiling 
when it was due.5 The two threats were (deliberately) related,6 although my 
focus here is the shutdown itself. The refusal of the Republican-controlled 
House to pass appropriations legislation reveals a tendency towards financial 
impasse that is quite unique to the United States. In both presidential and 
parliamentary systems abroad, governments do not generally stop functioning 
despite the difficulties of passing revenue bills. Yet a version of government 
shutdown by congressional deadlock has occurred repeatedly in recent U.S. 
history.7 This willingness to end government services and court financial peril 
– by congressional representatives of both parties – is distinctive to the United 
States and would alone justify a comparative study. 
But there is another and (from the perspective of constitutional law) more 
compelling reason to examine the U.S. government shutdown. It points to a 
deep tension between the responsibility of Congress to make laws for the 
people and its function of providing checks and balances, which is inseparable 
from the U.S. constitutional structure. The unfavorable political winds 
produced by a Republican-controlled House and a Democrat-controlled Senate 
– within the context of the extreme polarization of those parties – pressed on a 
particularly destructive tendency within the U.S. version of the separation of 
powers, against which the U.S. Constitution has few resources to marshal. This 
destructiveness plays out acutely in the context of budgetary legislation, where 
the effect of checks-and-balances deadlock is not simply a continuation of the 
status quo, as occurs in other areas of legislative impasse, but rather the active 
 
4 For the current distinction between essential and nonessential services, see infra note 
11 and accompanying text. 
5 See, e.g., Eric Morath & Sudeep Reddy, Budget Battle: Debt Ceiling Lurks as Bigger 
Threat, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2013, at A5. 
6 See infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the Republican strategy to end the 
U.S. shutdown). 
7 See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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shuttering of certain government operations. This can be compared with a 
series of other constitutional systems that avert financial impasse through 
constitutional design, constitutional culture, and a combination of the two. 
In this Article, I document a series of express provisions that act to forestall 
or resolve such impasse, across both presidential and parliamentary systems. 
At the risk of presenting too simplistic a catalogue of comparative 
constitutional design, I provide a more extensive focus on one system that did 
not prevent deadlock – the Australian constitutional crisis of 1975. Since most 
examinations of deadlock focus on presidentialism and the often unwieldy 
separation of powers between President and Congress, I draw on this case 
study to complicate an easy story of parliamentary functionality compared with 
presidential deadlock, and to highlight the availability of prorepresentative 
deadlock responses to financial impasse in bicameral institutions. Finally, I 
provide a brief analysis of three constitutional frames from which to think 
about constitutions, shutdowns, and political deadlock. While these frames 
help to clarify the advantages and disadvantages of what I term constitutional 
silence, default passage, or prorepresentative solutions, none of these frames 
can be assessed in isolation of politics: a problem with which I conclude. 
I. THE U.S. SHUTDOWN AND POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION 
Between October 1 and October 16, 2013, the U.S. government was shut 
down for general business.8 Due to a lapse in appropriations,9 all nonessential 
services were suspended – from the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
environmental monitoring, to the Food and Drug Administration’s drug and 
device approvals, to the National Parks Service’s maintenance of national 
parks services.10 Government employees were furloughed and government 
contracts were halted. Services were deemed “nonessential” if their delay 
would not compromise the safety of human life or property “in some degree.”11 
 
8 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, IMPACTS AND COSTS OF THE OCTOBER 2013 FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 4-6 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/NH6P-LMHA. 
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”). 
10 EPA, CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR SHUTDOWN (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/H5M6-J 
GMA; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONTINGENCY STAFFING PLAN FOR 
OPERATIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF ENACTED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS (2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/S9ZX-GJ6H; U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARKS SERVICES 
CONTINGENCY PLAN (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/DJ4S-F2S2; see also Memorandum 
from Audrey Rowe, Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to Kevin Concannon, Under Sec’y for 
Food, Nutrition, & Consumer Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Oct. 1, 2013), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/5CTY-63MV. 
11 Auth. for the Continuance of Gov’t Functions During a Temp. Lapse in 
Appropriations, 5 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7-8 (1981) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1342 
(2012)) (providing the opinions of Attorney General Civiletti on the implications of the 
Antideficiency Act); see also Antideficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877 (1982) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
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This test is governed by executive opinion12 and favors only emergency 
support for the classically defined liberties of life and property. Critically, the 
test ignores other government functions that are necessary to support a more 
positive conception of modern liberties, and which are arguably just as 
essential.13 Nonetheless describing the event as a “shutdown” is something of a 
misnomer – providers of “essential” services, such as the military and Social 
Security Administration, remained open.14 Yet many vulnerable groups and 
others relying on critical services, such as veterans with disability claims, 
children that benefit from the Head Start program, or those at risk of 
environmental harms, were left without recourse.15 The activities of a host of 
other groups, including national scientists, private-sector lenders, and 
government contractors, were also suspended.16 
The shutdown occurred after Congress failed to enact legislation 
appropriating funds for the 2014 fiscal year, as either a continuing resolution or 
 
12 Memorandum Opinion from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, to Dir. of Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Aug. 16, 1995), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/RVY9-WPFS (interpreting the 1990 amendments to the Antideficiency Act and 
emphasizing the need for “a reasonable and articulable connection between the function to 
be performed and the safety of human life or the protection of property, and when there is 
some reasonable likelihood that either or both would be compromised in some significant 
degree by the delay in the performance of the function in question”). The Office of 
Management and Budget provides agencies with instructions on how to prepare for and 
operate during a funding gap according to the Antideficiency Act. CLINTON T. BRASS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, 
PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS (2011), archived at http://perma.cc/9MP-JDD4. 
13 For a critique of the assumptions behind the classical conception of rights and 
freedom, see STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES 39-43 (1999); KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL RIGHTS 2-6 (2012). 
14 This is also due to the different sources of funding for “mandatory” or “entitlement” 
programs on the one hand, and “discretionary” or “appropriations” programs on the other. 
One analysis indicates that discretionary spending represents thirty percent, and mandatory 
spending sixty-four percent, of the projected federal spending for 2014. See Federal 
Spending: Where Does the Money Go?, NAT’L PRIORITIES PROJECT, http://nationalpriorities 
.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/spending (last visited Mar. 20, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z63N-NCFR. For an analysis of the attempt to integrate entitlements with 
appropriations, itself a cause of the 1995–1996 shutdowns, see Charles Tiefer, “Budgetized” 
Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress’s 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411 (1996). 
15 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 4-6 (acknowledging among 
various administrative services disruptions, the backlog in 20,000 veterans’ disability 
claims, the closure of Head Start services for 6300 children for nine days, and the “[h]alted 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) inspections at about 1200 sites, including 
hazardous waste facilities, chemical facilities, and drinking water systems” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
16 Id. at 5-10. 
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a final measure. It is well documented that this failure occurred due to the 
political standoff generated by disagreement over the implementation of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.17 The Act, which seeks to 
extend health insurance to all but a few million Americans through a complex 
system of expanding Medicaid, prohibiting discrimination against individuals 
with preexisting health conditions, providing health insurance subsidies for 
low-income individuals and families, and requiring individuals to purchase 
health insurance or pay a tax, attracted massive controversy along partisan 
lines. Democrats hailed it as “a health bill . . . [but] also a jobs bill, an 
economic recovery bill, . . . a deficit-reduction bill, . . . [and] an 
antidiscrimination bill”;18 Republicans described it as “a stunning assault on 
liberty.”19 After fierce contestation in Congress, the legislation passed in the 
Senate in December 2009 by a vote of sixty to thirty-nine, and passed the 
House in March 2010 by a vote of 219 to 212; Republicans were unanimously 
opposed in both chambers.20 The controversy then entered the courts as Florida 
and twelve other Republican-led states filed constitutional lawsuits within 
“minutes after the President signed” the Act into law, and thirteen additional 
Republican-led states followed shortly thereafter.21 The Supreme Court’s 
narrow and divided holding that the legislation was constitutional22 similarly 
galvanized a hostile partisan response, although the most vitriolic reactions 
came from a small, though vocal and well-funded minority.23 After the 
 
17 Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
18 David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Final Votes in Congress Cap Battle over 
Health, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A17 (reporting the remarks of Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid of Nevada). 
19 Open Executive Session to Consider an Original Bill Providing for Health Care 
Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 111th Cong. 65 (2009) (statement of 
Sen. Jon Kyl); Greg Hitt & Janet Adamy, GOP Assails Health-Plan Mandate, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 23, 2009, at A6 (reporting remarks of Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona). 
20 156 CONG. REC. H2153 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (providing the House voting results 
on the healthcare bill); 155 CONG. REC. 33,169-70 (Dec. 24, 2009) (providing the Senate 
voting results on the healthcare bill). 
21 E.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
Later, thirteen more states, as well as the National Federation of Independent Business 
(NFIB) and several individual complainants, joined the original plaintiffs. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2580. 
22 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
23 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Mike McIntire, A Crisis Months in the Planning, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at A1 (describing a loose knit conservative coalition as having formed 
from groups including Heritage Action, the Tea Party movement, and the Koch-funded 
Americans for Prosperity). 
  
996 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:991 
 
Supreme Court’s decision in June 2012, the controversy dovetailed into the 
November 2012 presidential campaign, which returned the President to a 
second term.24 Congressional Republicans continued to push for repeal of the 
Affordable Care Act, acting pursuant to a perceived mandate from the 
American people, that lead Congress to the threat of financial impasse in 
October 2013. 
By 2013, while moneys for the rollout of the new healthcare system had 
been secured by direct spending, appropriations for 2014 were not.25 During 
late September, as the deadline of passage for the 2014 fiscal budget loomed, 
the Republican-led House of Representatives conditioned its support for 
continuing resolutions on the delaying or defunding of the Affordable Care 
Act.26 The Democrat-led Senate passed several resolutions that refused these 
conditions.27 By September 30, 2013, no agreement had been reached between 
the chambers. On October 1, federal government activities were substantially 
restricted, due to the lack of appropriated funds. 
The failure to pass the appropriations legislation was strategically linked to 
the impending need for debt ceiling legislation, despite the qualitative 
differences between the two. The statutory debt limit, which controls the 
amount that the federal government can borrow, does not prevent the 
government from incurring obligations, but instead acts to limit the 
government’s ability to pay for obligations already incurred.28 Appropriations 
legislation acts in reverse. Nonetheless, one Republican strategist of the 
impasse, House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, expressly sought to 
combine the leverage of the shutdown with the debt ceiling limit.29 And indeed 
the standoff climaxed just before the debt limit was to be reached.30 Regular 
 
24 FEC, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. 
SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 3, 6 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Z 
6KF-82D9. 
25 159 CONG. REC. S6838-01 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2013) (statements of Sen. Coats, Sen. 
Cornyn & Sen. Ayotte) (referencing a Congressional Research Service report). 
26 159 CONG. REC. H5775 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2013). 
27 H.J. Res. 59 – Continuing Appropriations Resolution, U.S. CONGRESS, http://beta.cong 
ress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-joint-resolution/59/all-actions (last visited Dec. 11, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/CW74-8X8H (summarizing eighty-three actions on the 
appropriations bill taken by the House and Senate). 
28 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-203, DEBT LIMIT: DELAYS CREATE 
DEBT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND INCREASE UNCERTAINTY IN THE TREASURY MARKET 1 
(2011). 
29 Jonathan Strong, Paul Ryan: CR Fight Will Inevitably ‘Roll into’ Debt Ceiling Fight, 
The Corner, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Sept. 28, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com 
/corner/359818/paul-ryan-cr-fight-will-inevitably-roll-debt-ceiling-fight-jonathan-strong, 
archived at http://perma.cc/DS7B-HWLX. 
30 D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967, THE DEBT 
LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 1 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/AF76-Q87L 
(stating that the Treasury expected the government to exhaust its borrowing capacity on 
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government operations did not resume until October 17, after negotiations 
between President Obama and House Speaker Boehner led to the enactment of 
an interim appropriations bill.31 As a result, appropriations were guaranteed 
through January 15, 2014 on a pro rata basis and at the same funding level that 
applied to the 2013 fiscal year.32 The debt ceiling was suspended until 
February 7, 2014.33 The Act also authorized back payment to the 
(approximately 850,00034) government workers who were furloughed during 
the sixteen-day government shutdown.35 Estimates put the cost of the 
shutdown between two and six billion dollars in lost output, as well as a range 
of other costs.36 
On one view the shutdown itself was not unusual in light of the more 
general current experience of congressional wrangling, despite the massive 
disruption caused to government services. Including this most recent example, 
shutdown of the U.S. government has occurred eighteen times, all since the 
modern congressional budget process took effect in 1976.37 Nonetheless, “[t]he 
October 2013 Federal government shutdown was the second longest in 
duration since 1980 and the most significant on record, measured in terms of 
employee furlough days.”38 Polls recorded that Americans themselves viewed 
the 2013 shutdown as far more serious than previous instances.39 This trend 
 
approximately October 17, 2014). 
31 Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, 2013 U.S.C.C.A.N (127 
Stat. 555) (explaining how government funds will be appropriated retroactively to 
September 30, 2013); 159 CONG. REC. S7532 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2013); 159 CONG. REC. 
H6625-26 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2013). 
32 See Continuing Appropriations Act § 106. 
33 Id. § 1002(c)(1). 
34 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 13 (“Federal agencies furloughed 
roughly 850,000 employees per day in the immediate aftermath of the lapse in 
appropriations, or roughly 40 percent of the entire civilian Federal workforce.”). This 
number varied over the sixteen-day period. Id. at 13-14. 
35 Continuing Appropriations Act §§ 115-116. 
36 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 8 (“Leading independent forecasters 
estimate that the shutdown will lower fourth quarter real GDP growth by 0.2-0.6 percentage 
points or more, or $2-$6 billion in lost output.”). 
37 See BRASS, supra note 12, at 2-3. 
38 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 2. In 1995 to 1996, when President 
Bill Clinton and the House of Representatives (and its speaker, Newt Gingrich) failed to 
agree on a budget to fund federal services, the government was shutdown for twenty-six 
days over two stages. BRASS, supra note 12, at 2-3. In the 1980s, shutdowns occurred more 
regularly, but usually for a few days, and over weekends. During the six instances of 
impasse prior to 1980, government employees continued to work during a shutdown. See 
JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20348, FEDERAL FUNDING GAPS: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW 1-2 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/D6TD-XYFY. 
39 See Art Swift, Americans See Current Shutdown as More Serious than in ’95, GALLUP 
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165260/americans-current-shutdown-serious 
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towards more frequent, longer, and more burdensome shutdowns is itself a 
peculiarity of the United States, even more so than the single instance of 
shutdown in October 2013. This singularity is not because other political 
systems lack the deep contestation, even polarization, that marks the current 
U.S. political climate.40 Nor is it because other democracies do not exhibit 
regular acts of brinksmanship, horse trading, leveraging, and the extraction of 
concessions for one item by threatening another.41 Yet the stakes of the 
leverage – of sabotaging the running of government – is a particularly 
American phenomenon. Comparative constitutional design provides a partial 
explanation. 
II. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL IMPASSE 
The global response to the U.S. shutdown was bafflement and concern.42 A 
former finance minister of Colombia, José Antonio Ocampo, opined: “I had to 
negotiate budgets and debt ceilings in Colombia, and this situation is frankly 
unreal.”43 The disjuncture between apparent domestic composure in the United 
States and expressed international consternation was demonstrated in 
Germany’s Süddeutsche Zeitung, which reported: “What has already been 
apparent in America for a few years now is the self-destruction of one of the 
world’s oldest democracies.”44 Of course each jurisdiction has its own political 
problems and failures, but the shutdown of government though the obstruction 
of an appropriations bill is not one of them. Why is this so? 
It is tempting to answer by pointing to the exceptionalism of U.S. political 
culture. Certainly there is a willingness among members of the U.S. legislature 
to tolerate the possibility of a government shutdown, or at the very least the 
 
.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/QDK8-T2BR. 
40 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Foreword, “I Read the News Today, Oh Boy”: The 
Increasing Centrality of Constitutional Design, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1266-68 (2009) 
(offering a comparative reflection of constitutional problems); Richard Pildes, Why the 
Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 273, 276 (2011) (describing three causes for current U.S. hyperpolarized political 
conditions); see also DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 185-216 (3d ed. 2006) 
(explaining the general decline from the highpoint of consensus in the fifteen years 
following World War II, in advanced democracies). 
41 For a classic summary, see Philippe C. Schmitter, Dangers and Dilemmas of 
Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 58 (1994). For the link in constitutional practice, see Günter 
Frankenberg, Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 250, 256-64 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
42 Kevin Sullivan, Some Scratch Their Heads, Others Smirk, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2013, 
at A11. 
43 Id. 
44 Shutdown Spectacle: ‘America Is Already Politically Bankrupt,’ SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 
2, 2013, 3:07 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-press-review-on-us 
-government-shutdown-a-925768.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TZQ6-XW9F 
(summarizing German public commentary and quoting Süddeutsche Zeitung). 
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disabling of certain government services, that is not found elsewhere.45 Such 
willingness appears to sit comfortably with an ideology of negative 
constitutionalism – or in its most forceful guise, libertarianism – that endures 
in the United States.46 The cessation of services gives implicit support to the 
strident anti-tax, antigovernment rhetoric that is a feature of America’s 
conservative politics. This rhetoric goes beyond the pocket-book preferences 
against taxation increases that are common in other countries’ politics, to 
issues of patriotism and national character,47 from which the manifestation in 
the Tea Party movement is only its most recent version.48 A similar attribution 
of distrust of government is said to count for American exceptionalism against 
the more positive conception of constitutionalism;49 a conception that would 
suggest that government shutdown is itself unconstitutional, for many other 
constitutional democracies. 
Nonetheless this response offers a very restrictive understanding of 
American political culture.50 While influential, the antigovernment ideology is 
not necessarily dominant, even among Republicans, due in no small part to its 
inherent incongruity with many of the accepted tenets of the modern 
administrative state.51 The assumption of a widespread American tolerance for 
shutdowns also underrates the deep-seated commitments in the U.S. polity that 
 
45 See, e.g., 2 OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW ch. 6, at 146 (3d ed. 2006) (“[F]unding gaps 
are perhaps an inevitable reflection of the political process.”). 
46 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 30, 46 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
47 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax 
Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 824 (2002). 
48 Vanessa Williamson et al., The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican 
Conservativism, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 25, 26 (2011) (describing the emergence in 2009 of the 
Tea Party as “a new incarnation of long-standing strands in US conservatism”). 
49 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 46, at 147, 164-65 (“The aversion to state 
intervention is a distinctively American trait as compared to the political cultures of other 
advanced industrial democracies . . . .”). 
50 See EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 9 (2013) (describing the “new waves 
of research” that demonstrate “that Americans have long embraced government and that 
American political culture cannot be described as simply anti-statist or exclusively liberal”). 
On the dangers of “reading-back” from legal-doctrinal differences to socio-cultural ones, see 
Frank I. Michelman, The Protective Function of the State in the United States and Europe: 
The Constitutional Question, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM (Georg Nolte ed., 
2005). 
51 See ALAN WOLFE, DOES AMERICAN DEMOCRACY STILL WORK? 19 (2006) (observing 
the split within the Republican Party between advocates of small government and those of a 
powerful executive). 
  
1000 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:991 
 
sustain a more positive conception of government.52 A more complex answer 
about political culture points to its bedrock in U.S. constitutional theory, where 
assumptions are made about constitutional practice that are themselves 
contradictory of modern government. This theory informs both current 
constitutional culture and original constitutional design. 
Thus we turn to the Madisonian system of separated powers, with its 
question of “whether ‘checks and balances sufficient for the purposes of order 
justice and the general good,’ might be created by dividing and distributing 
power among ‘different bodies, differently constituted, but all deriving their 
existence from the elective principle and all bound by a responsible tenure of 
their trusts.’”53 In this system the President may be forced to govern without a 
guaranteed majority in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. The 
inevitable interbranch deadlocks that result is a design feature of the U.S. 
political system, rather than a bug. This feature entrenches the eighteenth-
century theory – venerably associated with The Federalist Papers – that a 
government checked and balanced against itself is the best guarantee of 
political liberty.54 The resulting veto points between the chambers and 
branches, along with fixed legislative and executive terms and elections at 
separate and different intervals, are designed to slow government down and 
minimize its activity. This theory is based on a suspicion of government 
process, rather than the promotion of its active duties: because “[e]nlightened 
statesmen will not always be at the helm,”55 a divided power allows “ambition 
to counteract ambition.”56 
The theoretical elegance of separated power was lost, however, to practical 
developments. The levers of political competition and cooperation envisaged 
by the system were soon channeled, not through the separated branches, but 
through political parties.57 As these parties became more disciplined and 
polarized over time, very different systems of separated powers applied during 
different partisan configurations: namely those operating in times of either 
divided or unified government.58 Only under divided government – where 
 
52 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 61-95 (2004) (acknowledging the 
significant importance attested by Franklin D. Roosevelt to rights to housing, medical care, 
unemployment support, and food); William E. Forbath, Social and Economic Rights in the 
American Grain, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 55, 58 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel 
eds., 2009). 
53 Letter from James Madison to John Adams (1817), quoted in John Ferejohn, 
Madisonian Separation of Powers, in JAMES MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 126, 127 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003). 
54 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison). 
55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 75 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 55, at 319 (James Madison). 
57 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006). 
58 Id. at 2330-47. 
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different parties control the different branches – does financial impasse 
become likely.59 And, given that divided government has become the more 
common alternative since 1954,60 and that party leadership has become central 
to budgetary negotiations since the 1980s,61 the distance between the Framers’ 
vision and current practice becomes obvious. Moreover, in the particular 
partisan configurations in the United States, where belief in the value of 
government programs is not equal between the parties, one party – the 
Republican Party – is more tolerant of shutdowns, and thus enjoys a bargaining 
advantage in budgetary negotiations.62 The proliberty ideals of checks and 
balances, and the separation of powers, play out very differently in practice. 
Moreover, the theoretical conflation of the principles of the separation of 
powers and the system of checks and balances may itself be unwarranted.63 As 
Jeremy Waldron has suggested, the separation of powers principle stands for 
an ideal of governance in which the distinct institutions – the executive, the 
legislature, and the judiciary – enjoy a distinct integrity.64 The checks and 
balances principle, on the other hand, “hold[s] that the exercise of power by 
any one power-holder needs to be balanced and checked by the exercise of 
power by other power-holders.”65 Once isolated in this way, the two principles 
have very different implications for the practice of lawmaking and for the 
justifications of checks or vetoes. The role of the legislature involves much 
more than what it can do to hold the executive in check. There are active 
responsibilities of lawmaking at stake, which apply particularly to the 
prevention of financial impasse. 
The attitude of checks and balances as the separation of power serves the 
modern-day legislative burden of America, and other constitutional systems, 
even less than it served the needs of the founding era.66 The resulting 
 
59 Cf. id. at 2342-43, 2348 (highlighting the normative concerns with unified, rather than 
divided, government according to separation of powers ideals). 
60 Tiefer, supra note 14, at 438. 
61 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The 
Anatomy of the 1995-96 Budget “Train Wreck,” 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 594-96 (1998). 
62 David Gamage & David Louk, Government Shutdowns, the New Fiscal Politics, and 
the Case for Default Budgets 44 (Univ. of Cal. Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2339314, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9VSR-GH2S (“[G]overnment shutdowns are more 
harmful to Democratic Party priorities than to Republican Party priorities. This bargaining 
advantage enjoyed by Republicans can potentially distort the democratic budgeting process 
away from reflecting the desires of the median voter.”). 
63 See Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
433, 442, 467 (2013) (“[A]ll that Checks and Balances cares about is that power checks 
power or be required to concur in another power’s exercise; again what the powers are that 
counterpoise each other in this balance is of incidental interest.” Id. at 442.). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 433. 
66 See Jonathan Zasloff, The Tyranny of Madison, 44 UCLA L. REV. 795, 798, 800 
(1997). For a presentation of Madison’s own expectations to the adjustments of the 
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deadlocks are one of the reasons checks-and-balances presidentialism has 
earned a bad name, in America no less than in other presidential systems, 
despite this venerable Madisonian pedigree.67 Ambition may check ambition, 
but rival claims of a representative mandate can create deadlock without a 
machinery of resolution.  
Yet the experience of other constitutional democracies – presidential as well 
as parliamentary – has been different. One way of preventing financial impasse 
is to rethink the applicability of separation of powers principles, or of checks 
and balances. Another is to implement such principles with very different 
design features of budgetary passage. Here, comparative study reveals a range 
of resolutions to the threat and occurrence of financial impasse. In fact over 
half of presidential constitutions stipulate a course of action if a budget is not 
approved.68 In parliamentary systems, too, the impasse is often resolved, as one 
would expect, through the very different conception of separated powers. Of 
course the heterogeneity within these categories complicates an easy story of 
resolution, as described in the following discussion. 
A basic division between presidential and parliamentary systems is often 
thought integral to the understanding of government deadlock.69 Presidential 
constitutions emphasize the separation of powers between the two branches, 
and hence the legislative oversight of the executive, and vice versa. In this way 
they are said to be distinctive from parliamentary constitutions, where the 
ministerial executive is drawn from the elected members of the legislature (and 
its lower house in bicameral systems).70 The fixed terms of those elected under 
presidential constitutions are said to afford different opportunities for the 
legislature to initiate legislative proposals, and to prevent an easy resolution of 
the inevitable interbranch deadlocks that occur.71 Two very different 
procedures for legislation in general, and for appropriations legislation in 
particular, are therefore assumed to apply in presidential and parliamentary 
systems.72 Yet such characterizations can be misleading.73 Fixed terms now 
 
principle, see Ferejohn, supra note 53, at 126. 
67 For the classic criticism, see Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. 
DEMOCRACY 51 (1990). 
68 José Antonio Cheibub et al., Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and 
Historical Perspective, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1707, 1726-27 (2011). 
69 See Richard Albert, Presidential Values in Parliamentary Democracies, 8 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 207, 221 (2010) (“Unlike presidential systems, parliamentary systems are 
generally unsusceptible to deadlock situations.”). 
70 MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 18-19, 76 (1992) (distinguishing 
presidential separation from the legislature by their “origin” in direct elections, and their 
“survival” through fixed terms). 
71 See George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 289, 325 (1995). 
72 For an application of this division by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (then 
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apply in parliamentary systems, even the archetype model of the United 
Kingdom.74 And as discussed below, modern presidential constitutions allow 
the executive to initiate or bypass legislative processes around budget bills, in a 
way that confounds the traditional categorization between presidentialism and 
parliamentarianism, leading to noteworthy institutional mechanisms for the 
resolution of the financial impasse. 
The presidential constitutions in Latin America (the region with the decisive 
majority of such systems) demonstrate a series of design options.75 In 
Colombia, for example, the constitution provides for the aversion of a 
government shutdown through a default provision that simply applies the 
previous year’s budget if a resolution is not reached.76 A similar continuation 
operates in Honduras, Paraguay, and Venezuela, if the budget has not yet been 
 
the U.S. General Accounting Office), see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AMFMD-
86-16, APPROPRIATIONS: CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS AND AN ASSESSMENT OF AUTOMATIC 
FUNDING APPROACHES 26-27 (1986), archived at http://perma.cc/QT64-3PHV (suggesting 
that parliamentary systems have little need for automatic or temporary funding, and are thus 
“not fully relatable” to U.S. budgetary impasse experience). 
73 José Antonio Cheibub et al., Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, BRIT. J. 
POL. SCI. FIRSTVIEW 1, 3 (Nov. 14, 2013), http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbs 
tract?fromPage=online&aid=9072592&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S000712341300032X.  
74 For example the U.K. prototypical parliamentary system now operates under the Fixed 
Term Parliaments Act 2011, thus removing the prime minister’s power to call an election at 
will. See Fixed Terms Parliamentary Act 2011, c. 14, § 1 (U.K.) (establishing a specific 
recurring date for future parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom). In Norway, too, 
the Parliament (Storting) is subject to fixed four-year terms. CONSTITUTION OF NORWAY 
1814, art. 71, translated in The Constitution – Complete Text, STORTINGET, https://www 
.stortinget.no/en/In-English/About-the-Storting/The-Constitution/The-Constitution (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UQV4-ZT9U; see also Lov om valg til 
Stortinget, fylkesting og kommunestyrer (valgloven) [Representation of the People Act], 
2002, §§ 9-1(1), 9-2(1) (Nor.) (establishing a recurring date every four years for 
parliamentary elections). The Storting has functioned as a purely unicameral body since 
2009. 43 INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, CHRONICLE OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: 2009, 
at 192 (2010), archived at http://perma.cc/9L79-DDNA. 
75 The primary data from this section is taken from the innovative new constitutional 
research tool. CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). The 
accessibility of this data opens the way for a significant update and revision of previous 
landmark findings by political scientists on the comparative operation of legislative-
executive and bicameral relations. See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY, at xii 
(1999) (assessing data from 1945–1996 and from 1971–1996); GEORGE TSEBELIS & 
JEANNETTE MONEY, BICAMERALISM 64-68 (1997) (providing data from 1986–1995). 
Analysis of this data also updates the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s comparative 
assessment of automatic continuing resolutions, which it undertook in 1986. See U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 72. 
76 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 348, translated in CONSTITUTE, 
COLOMBIA’S CONSTITUTION OF 1991 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2005, at 80 (n.d.), 
archived at http://perma.cc/XLB6-8W5Q. 
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voted on by the beginning of a new fiscal year;77 or has not been presented to, 
or has been rejected by, the legislature.78 In Bolivia the budget must be 
approved by the legislature within sixty days; if it is not, it is automatically 
approved.79 So too in Chile, the budget is rendered effective after sixty days in 
Congress.80 The constitution of Panama also makes explicit provision for an 
extension of the previous budget in the event of a rejected budget, as well as 
for the automatic approval of payment for the public investments, contractual 
obligations, and public debt that might be affected.81 Brazil’s constitution, 
which does not provide explicitly for such a default option, requires that 
budget legislation not be tied to any other provisions, thereby forestalling some 
element of horse-trading.82 These constitutional systems all borrowed from the 
U.S. presidential model,83 which served the basic structure for both original 
and recent Latin American constitutions,84 but their express departure from the 
U.S. Constitution’s permissiveness of financial impasse suggests that, in this 
respect, the latter may have served as a negative model to avoid.85 And in turn 
 
77 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE HONDURAS [C.P.] art. 368, translated in CONSTITUTE, 
HONDURAS’ CONSTITUTION OF 1982 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2012, at 61 (n.d.), 
archived at http://perma.cc/JJ7S-ZJ5Y. 
78 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL PARAGUAY [C.P.] art. 217, 
translated in CONSTITUTE, PARAGUAY’S CONSTITUTION OF 1992 WITH AMENDMENTS 
THROUGH 2011, at 38 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/6MZJ-ERYK; see also 
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [C.P.] art. 313, translated in 
CONSTITUTE, VENEZUELA’S CONSTITUTION OF 1999 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2009, at 
63 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/GY97-PH7M. 
79 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE BOLIVIA [C.P.] art. 158, § I, cl. 11, translated in 
CONSTITUTE, BOLIVIA’S CONSTITUTION FROM 2009, at 41 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
L4FG-WXMT. 
80 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 67, translated in 
CONSTITUTE, CHILE’S CONSTITUTION OF 1980 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2012, at 30 
(n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/7468-MJM5. 
81 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMA [C.P.] arts. 272, 273, translated 
in CONSTITUTE, PANAMA’S CONSTITUTION OF 1972 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2004, at 46 
(n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/Q9QG-PY73. 
82 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 165, § 8 (Braz.), translated in 
CONSTITUTE, BRAZIL’S CONSTITUTION OF 1988 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2005, at 92 
(n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/5RBG-5TQ8. 
83 See Cheibub et al., supra note 68, at 1713 (examining the basic influence of the U.S. 
presidential model, but observing that U.S. presidentialism was not adopted as “a package 
deal”). 
84 Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Introduction, in PRESIDENTIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 1, 2 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 
1997) (summarizing the debates in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia, to 
depart from a presidential form of government, after the transitions to democracy that 
occurred in the region from the mid-1980s onwards). 
85 Id. at 3 (“[P]residentialism comes in different varieties and . . . these variations can be 
as important as the broad differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism.”). For 
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many of the design options presented by Latin American constitutions have 
been replicated in new presidential constitutions in other regions of the world, 
reinforcing the departure from U.S. experience.86 
A constitutional rule for the prevention of financial impasse (and of the 
threat of it occurring) is not unique to presidential systems. In parliamentary 
systems, the Prime Minister’s status as a member of parliament makes 
deadlocks between the branches less likely but, as we see in the Australian 
case study, not impossible. The executive and legislative branches exist in a 
relation of mutual independence, not separation. Governments in parliamentary 
systems therefore maintain control over the legislative agenda, and a vote of no 
confidence by the parliament results in the immediate defeat of the government 
(an outcome itself minimized by party discipline, pursuant to which members 
of parliament who propose or vote for such a motion risk either expulsion from 
the caucus or removal via election).87 There is variety between Westminster 
 
further discussion of the distinctive veto powers in different constitutions, see Matthew 
Soberg Shugart & Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: 
Rethinking the Terms of the Debate, in PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN 
AMERICA, supra note 84, at 12, 41-44. For a description of negative models of constitutional 
influence, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case 
for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
296, 300 (2003). 
86 See, e.g., AFG. CONST. ch. 5, art. 98, translated in CONSTITUTE, AFGHANISTAN’S 
CONSTITUTION OF 2004, at 17 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/VK6J-VD78 (automatically 
applying the previous year’s budget); CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU BÉNIN art. 110, 
translated in CONSTITUTE, BENIN’S CONSTITUTION OF 1990, at 20 (n.d.), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/5W6H-G4HC (establishing that provisions of an appropriations bill may be 
enforced by edict); CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI art. 177, translated in 
CONSTITUTE, BURUNDI’S CONSTITUTION OF 2005, at 26 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/U7 
6B-R86L (granting power to establish a budget by decree); CONSTITUTION DE L’UNION DES 
COMORES art. 27 (Comoros), translated in CONSTITUTE, COMOROS’ CONSTITUTION OF 2001 
WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2009, at 11 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/5ERK-AHJR 
(granting power to establish a budget by ordinance after sixty days); CONSTITUTION DE LA 
COTE D’IVOIRE art. 80, translated in CONSTITUTE, COTE D’IVOIRE’S CONSTITUTION OF 2000, 
at 13 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/9S8G-AWBF (granting power to establish the 
budget by ordinance after seventy days). Latin America does not serve as the only series of 
models for these nations. For example, there are also parallels with the semipresidential 
constitution of France. See 1958 CONST. 47 (Fr.) (granting the power to use funds by 
decree). For a general description of the phenomenon of borrowing in constitutional design, 
see Vlad F. Perju, Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing, and Migrations, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304 (Michel Rosenfeld & András 
Sajó eds., 2012). 
87 Such votes are therefore rare in two-party democracies, but more common for 
multiparty systems in which a minority party must form a coalition government. For 
disturbing manifestations of this latter tendency as presenting a significant disadvantage to 
parliamentarianism, see Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 
1420 (2007). For the recent blocking of the attempt in Canada, see Gary Levy, A Crisis Not 
Made in a Day, in PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS, supra note 2, at 19, 26. 
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and consensus models within these systems,88 and between those with two 
chambers of parliament and those with one.89 In bicameral parliamentary 
systems a tendency for impasse can result when the lower and upper houses are 
unable to agree, with upper house refusal more likely, given the executive’s 
majority in the lower house.90 In many constitutions special procedures 
nonetheless exist to resolve this process for legislation in general and 
sometimes expressly for financial legislation in particular. 
In the prototypical Westminster parliamentary system of the United 
Kingdom, for example, supply bills are presented to the House of Commons 
for passage (and their defeat there, if only a theoretical possibility, would 
present a no confidence motion); yet the (unelected) House of Lords has no 
power to reject such a bill, and can only delay it by one month.91 Similarly, in 
Australia’s parliamentary system, such bills originate in the House of 
Representatives, but Australia departs from the U.K. model insofar as the 
Senate may defer or reject supply bills, thus creating the conditions for 
financial impasse.92 In the unicameral parliament of Israel, a failure to pass the 
budget within three months may be grounds for early election.93 In unicameral 
Sweden, on the other hand, the constitution provides that the most recent 
national budget applies until a new budget is adopted.94 In India, the (lower) 
House of the People need not accept the recommendations of the (upper) 
Council of States on the budget: the budget is deemed passed by both houses if 
amendments are not accepted or if fourteen days have passed.95 In Japan, the 
constitution provides an elaborate procedure for reaching consensus on the 
budget between the two houses, but if consensus is not reached within thirty 
sitting days, the decision of the House of Representatives is final.96 And in 
 
88 See generally LIJPHART, supra note 75, at 9-47. 
89 See id. at 200-15; TSEBELIS & MONEY, supra note 75, at 44-70. 
90 Again, coalition governments whose majority does not rest on a single party can 
introduce dissensus in the lower house as well. 
91 Parliament Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 1(1). The composition of the House of 
Lords has been the subject of several reform proposals. See, e.g., House of Lords Reform 
Bill 2012-13, H.L. Bill [52] cl. 2 (U.K.) (proposing to increase the electoral credentials of 
the second chamber). 
92 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 53; see infra Part III. 
93 Section 36A Amendment to the Basic Law, 5761–2001, SH No. 1780 p. 166 (Isr.), 
translated in CONSTITUTE, ISRAEL’S CONSTITUTION OF 1958 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 
2013, at 10 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/SCH6-PDC7. 
94 REFERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 9:5, translated in CONSTITUTE, SWEDEN’S 
CONSTITUTION OF 1974 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2012, at 20 (n.d.), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/QY6V-PBFV. 
95 INDIA CONST. art. 109, cl. 4, 5, translated in CONSTITUTE, INDIA’S CONSTITUTION OF 
1949 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2004, at 37 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/QW6P-T 
EBM. 
96 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 60, translated in CONSTITUTE, 
JAPAN’S CONSTITUTION OF 1946, at 10 (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/3GLU-BFTU. 
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Germany if the budget is not approved after simultaneous presentation to the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat, the constitution immediately guarantees a temporary 
budget for meeting public debts and contractual obligations.97 
Of course, this comparison does not take into account actual constitutional 
practice in each system; which procedures are spelled out in constitutional text 
may tell us little about how they are observed and how they relate to other 
constitutional rules and practices. Nor does it canvas the numerous statutory 
and administrative rules that determine budgetary process, of what we might 
call each country’s true “fiscal constitution.”98 In particular, one might want to 
examine how the distinction between appropriations and mandatory spending 
plays out in each locale. Nonetheless the above survey does suggest that the 
better comparison, when examining the resolution of financial impasse, is not 
between parliamentary and presidential systems, but between three main types 
of constitutional resolution for any impasse created about financial legislation 
(with much variety within each category). The first is for a default rule that 
applies to continue the provisions of the previous budget, or to pass 
automatically the provisions of the proposed current budget, after a stipulated 
period. This applies to overcome congressional dissent in presidential systems, 
or upper house dissent in parliamentary ones. The second form of resolution is 
a constitutional rule that creates a prorepresentative resolution for immediate 
election in the light of impasse. This resolution is further complicated by the 
fact that it may be triggered not simply by dissent in a single chamber or in the 
lower house of a bicameral parliament, as traditional parliamentary sovereignty 
would require, but also by a upper house dissent umpired by an independent 
arbiter, as occurred in Australia. The third form of resolution is constitutional 
silence, and the toleration of a government shutdown as simply one more 
feature in the difficulties of modern government, and one that must be resolved 
purely by political negotiation and compromise. I example these features more 
fully in the final Part of this Article, after detailing the case study of financial 
impasse in Australia in Part III. 
III. BEHIND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: AUSTRALIA’S FINANCIAL IMPASSE 
The shutdown of government in a constitutional democracy is thus often 
constitutionally prevented in both presidential and parliamentary systems. It is 
also exceedingly rare. One exceptional example comes from Australia, where 
the Parliament experienced legislative deadlock and the failure to pass an 
appropriations bill in 1975, in what has been described as “the most dramatic 
and controversial single incident in Australian political and constitutional 
 
97 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. III (Ger.), translated in CONSTITUTE, GERMAN FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC’S CONSTITUTION OF 1949 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2012, at 53, archived at 
http://perma.cc/32U7-2ZXN. 
98 For the original concept of the fiscal constitution, as applied to America, see Kenneth 
W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272, 278-82 (1977). 
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history.”99 In some ways, the political preconditions for the crisis were 
somewhat analogous to the American scenario of 2013, although heightened in 
different ways. In December 1972, the Australian Labor Party had been elected 
after twenty-three years in opposition.100 This party originated in the Australian 
labor movement and came to power on a platform of social reform, which 
included greater federal involvement in education, a workers’ compensation 
scheme, consumer protection laws, urban infrastructure projects, Aboriginal 
land rights, and – strikingly relevant to the current U.S. counterpoint – the 
creation of a universal system of health insurance.101 These reforms, far-
reaching in their vision of welfare as well as their new vision of federalism, 
were adamantly opposed by the Liberal Party and National Country Party102 – 
the two parties that comprise the Liberal-National Party Coalition currently in 
government in Australia.103 It was a deeply polarized, and deeply hostile, 
partisan environment.104 
The source of the bicameral deadlock that occurred was the inverse of the 
tensions in the 2013 U.S. shutdown context. The 1972 election had given the 
Australian Labor Party a majority in the House of Representatives, but no 
Senate majority.105 During Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s first year and a 
half of office, many of his reforms were defeated in the Senate.106 The bill for 
universal health insurance, for example, failed to pass the Senate in 1973.107 In 
 
99 Michael Coper & George Williams, Preface, in POWER, PARLIAMENT AND THE PEOPLE, 
at v, v (Michael Coper & George Williams eds., 1997); see also Paul Kelly, The Dismissal 
and Australian Democracy, in POWER, PARLIAMENT AND THE PEOPLE, supra, at 126, 126. 
100 1 THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 2003, at 549 (Joanne Maher & Phillip McIntyre 
eds., 44th ed. 2003). 
101 Gough Whitlam, Leader of the Australian Labor Party, It’s Time for Leadership: 
Australian Labor Party Policy Speech (Nov. 13, 1972), archived at http://perma.cc/Z3W7-
WH38 (putting forth the Australian Labor Party’s policy platform positions for the coming 
year). 
102 GEOFFREY SAWER, FEDERATION UNDER STRAIN: AUSTRALIA 1972–1975 (1977). 
103 The Coalition government was elected on September 7, 2013. See Your Prime 
Minister, PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTL., https://www.pm.gov.au/your-pm (last visited Mar. 25, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3LDG-229T. 
104 As an Independent Senator described at the time, in language not unfamiliar to current 
observers in the United States: “One can sort of smell this atmosphere of hate which is 
pervading this chamber and emanating from certain members on the Opposition benches.” 
Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 Apr. 1973, 915 (Reginald Turnbull, Senator, Austl.). 
105 SAWER, supra note 102, at 8. Compare this to the United States, which has a 
Democratic President, a Democrat-controlled Senate and a Republican-controlled House. 
See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
106 See George Winterton, 1975: The Dismissal of the Whitlam Government, in 
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS 229, 231 (H.P. Lee & George Winterton eds., 
2003). 
107 Cth, Senate, 12 Dec. 1973, 2737, 2768-9 (Senator Rae) (showing that Senator Rae’s 
amendment requiring that the Health Insurance Bill be withdrawn received a majority of 
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April 1974, Whitlam sought to dissolve both Houses under section 57 of the 
Australian Constitution, an antideadlock clause triggered by repeated failure to 
pass legislation.108 At the time, members of the Senate had signaled that they 
would act to defer a money bill,109 but it was their general obstruction of 
Whitlam’s legislative program that grounded the recourse to immediate 
election. This option of “double dissolution,” feasible in the confidence-of-the-
assembly terms of parliamentary systems, would be inconceivable under a 
presidential system because it would violate the principle of separation of 
powers as locally understood. It is an antideadlock device that turns to the 
people, and specifically to their votes, thus relying on the device of election as 
the best mode of resolution. Hence this measure allows the Prime Minister to 
call for a new election on the basis of deadlock, after which a successfully 
returned Prime Minister can seek a joint sitting of both houses to pass any 
legislation that has been stymied for at least three months. The request for 
dissolution must be approved by the Governor-General, the Queen’s 
representative in Australia. Such approval was granted in April 1974.110 An 
election in May returned the Australian Labor Party to power, again with a 
majority in the House – a prerequisite for government in the Westminster 
parliamentary system – but again without a Senate majority, now lacking by 
nine rather than five Senators.111 The opposition members in the Australian 
Senate interpreted the result of the 1974 elections as having given them “a 
mandate to oppose of equivalent magnitude to that of the House of 
Representatives’ mandate to propose.”112 
 
votes). 
108 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 57 (granting the Governor-General power to dissolve 
both houses if the House repeatedly passes a bill that the Senate rejects); see Leslie Zines, 
The Double Dissolution and Joint Sitting, in LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTION 1972-1975, at 
217, 217 (Gareth Evans ed., 1977). 
109 Zines, supra note 108, at 217; see Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 10 Apr. 1974, 
887, 889. The Annual Appropriations Acts provide, like the U.S. congressional 
appropriations process, annual funding for government operations. They are introduced into 
Parliament on a fixed date and, when passed, fund approximately twenty-five percent of all 
federal government expenditure for the year. Similar to the distinction between mandatory 
and discretionary funding in the United States, a framework for special appropriations 
establishes that the authority for particular funding, such as Social Security, may be 
provided in special Acts. See, e.g., The Commonwealth’s Appropriation Framework - An 
Introduction, AUSTRALIAN DEP’T OF FIN., http://www.finance.gov.au/budget/budget-process/ 
appropriation-bills.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/L6PJ-WQ3 
W. Compare id., with supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
110 Zines, supra note 108, at 217. 
111 See SAWER, supra note 102, at 43. 
112 PAUL KELLY, NOVEMBER 1975: THE INSIDE STORY OF AUSTRALIA’S GREATEST 
POLITICAL CRISIS 61 (1995) (quoting statements of Senators Reg Withers and Ivor 
Greenwood). 
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In the long history of constitution making since the U.S. Constitution of 
1789, Australia’s Constitution of 1901 is old enough to count as enduring, but 
young enough to have borrowed from the U.S. constitutional example. Almost 
as difficult to amend as its American counterpart,113 the constitution remains 
distanced from the modern constitutions of the post–World War II and post–
Cold War eras. The constitutional structure itself is a combination of British 
parliamentarism and American federalism in a system known colloquially as 
Washminster – a Washington/Westminster hybrid.114 This means that Australia 
has a parliamentary system with the executive drawn from the House of 
Representatives (and thus no corporal separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative branches), and a division of powers between the 
federal and state governments. Moreover the Senate (the elected “State’s 
House”115) is given power to amend legislation, apart from money bills. The 
Madisonian idea of “checks and balances” sits uncomfortably with the more 
positive responsibilities of the executive and legislature to govern responsibly. 
Such tensions were not lost on the Australian founders, one of whom predicted 
that “either responsible government will kill federation, or federation in the 
form in which we shall, I hope, be prepared to accept it, will kill responsible 
government.”116 The search for an adequate antideadlock provision took more 
time during the constitutional debates of 1897–1898 than any other subject, 
taking up 400 of the 1100 pages of the official record.117 
The “joint sitting” is an antideadlock technique designed for the purpose of 
resolving disagreements between the two chambers, but it was a procedure that 
had not been used before in Australia, and has not been used since 1974.118 It 
 
113 Compare AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128, with U.S. CONST. art. V. Of forty-two 
amendment proposals put to the Australian people, only eight have been carried. JOHN 
MCMILLAN, PAPERS ON PARLIAMENT NO. 13, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 
(1991), archived at http://perma.cc/UVZ8-ZJZ3. 
114 Elaine Thompson, The “Washminster” Mutation, in RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN 
AUSTRALIA 32, 32-40 (Patrick Weller & Dean Jaensch eds., 1980). But see Elaine 
Thompson, The Constitution and the Australian System of Limited Government, Responsible 
Government and Representative Democracy: Revisiting the Washminster Mutation, 24 
U.N.S.W. L.J. 657, 661-63 (2001). 
115 This concept is attributed to Edmund Barton, leader of the Constitutional Convention 
in 1897, reflecting a certain obliviousness on the part of the founders to the rise of political 
parties as dominant forces in each chamber. 
116 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL AUSTRALASIAN CONVENTION DEBATES: SYDNEY 
2, MARCH TO 9, APRIL, 1891, at 280 (1891) [hereinafter AUSTRALASIAN CONVENTION 
DEBATES] (quoting Senator Hackett). 
117 CONSULTATIVE GRP. ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., 
RESOLVING DEADLOCKS: THE PUBLIC RESPONSE: REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 12 (2004) (canvassing the Sydney Convention of 1897–1898).  
118 Double Dissolution, Fact Sheets, PARLIAMENTARY EDUC. OFFICE, http://www.peo.gov 
.au/learning/fact-sheets/double-dissolution.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6VQD-HM7N. For an exploration of the proposal to increase the use of this 
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allows for an exceptional unicameral process within a constitution that sets out 
bicameral machinery119 (one might imagine the joint session of the American 
State of the Union Address being used to pass contentious legislation). A 
prerequisite to employing the joint sitting is two attempts to pass the 
contentious legislation through both chambers, with an interval of three months 
in between.120 The required interval makes the provision inapt to deal with the 
blockage of appropriations legislation.121 During the August 1974 joint sitting, 
the two chambers passed legislation establishing the system of universal health 
insurance – the basis of which still endures, with current partisan debate 
reduced to particular features.122 The proceedings of the joint sitting of 
Parliament were televised to the nation, also a first.123 The Senate, with its 
seventy-six members compared to the House of Representatives’ 150 members 
was for the moment disarmed. Four of the six pieces of legislation passed were 
later challenged in the High Court, which held section 57 to be a justiciable 
procedure, and all but one were held to have satisfied the procedural 
requirements.124 
Nonetheless the problems for the Whitlam government were not to end there 
– and in fact, were to grow much worse. In October 1975, the Senate made a 
second threat to defer a money bill – and this time acted on it. It refused to pass 
 
provision by allowing its use without a preceding election or straight after an election, see 
CONSULTATIVE GRP. ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 117, at 7-8. The dissolution 
provision of section 57 has been proposed six times. Id. 
119 See Zines, supra note 108, at 225 (suggesting that the issue of how exceptional such a 
process is has not been resolved). 
120 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 57. 
121 This incompatibility was noted by Australian Governor-General Sir John Kerr in 
justification of his controversial decisionmaking below. See Sir John R. Kerr, Governor-
Gen., Austl., Public Statement (Nov. 11, 1975), reprinted in Current Topics, 49 AUSTL. L.J. 
645, 648 (1975) (explaining that section 57 “necessarily entails a considerable time lag 
which is quite inappropriate to a speedy resolution of the fundamental problems posed by 
the refusal of supply”). 
122 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) (“An Act providing for Payments by way of 
Medical Benefits and Payments for Hospital Services and for other purposes . . . .”). 
Nonetheless, one of the first acts to dismantle the legislation began a year after Whitlam’s 
dismissal, with the universal 1.35% levy on taxable income replaced by an optional 2.5% 
levy and the establishment of Medibank Private. UNDERSTANDING THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM 9 (Eileen Willis et al. eds., 2008). 
123 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., ODGERS AUSTRALIAN SENATE PRACTICE 739 (13th ed. 
2012). 
124 W. Austl. v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 201, 295-96 (holding that the three 
statutes being challenged, the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1973, the Senate 
(Representation of Territories) Act 1973, and the Representation Act 1973, were all valid 
laws and within the legislative powers of the House and Senate); Victoria v. Commonwealth 
(1975) 134 CLR 81 (Petroleum and Minerals Auth. Case) (holding the passage of the 
Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act 1973 (Cth) through the Joint Sitting to be invalid); 
Cormack v Cope (1974) 131 CLR 432. 
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budget legislation until the government called another election, which the 
Whitlam government declined to do.125 The government at the time was rocked 
by scandals unrelated to its legislative program.126 On an influential 
interpretation of Senate powers under the constitution, the Senate had the 
constitutional power to reject or defer – or defer conditionally – appropriations 
bills.127 Nonetheless the government argued that a convention applied – that is, 
an obligatory practice derived from practice itself – that a House of Review 
should not reject financial legislation.128 At the time evidence of the 
convention was presented by “the fact that on 139 previous occasions money 
bills have been passed by a Senate in which the Government of the day lacked 
a majority, and none has been previously rejected.”129 Citing unsuccessful 
attempts to refuse supply in Australian state parliaments and a “duty to resist” 
the recalcitrance of upper houses, the same commentator observed: “It is the 
Lower House which, in the Westminster parliamentary system, has always 
made the Government of the day and it is only the Lower House which should 
be able to break it.”130 
The Whitlam government scrambled to keep the government running, 
coming up with a (rather questionable) plan to meet its creditors in a different 
way.131 The Senate would not be moved, deferring the appropriations bills by a 
 
125 Winterton, supra note 106, at 236. 
126 For a discussion of the government’s controversial proposal for international 
borrowing, known as the “loans affair” as well as other scandals, see, for example, 2 JENNY 
HOCKING, GOUGH WHITLAM 202-08, 231-36 (2012). 
127 The Australian Constitution prohibits the Senate from proposing or amending 
revenue, money, or taxation bills. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 53. Nevertheless, the Senate 
relied on previous interpretations of the constitution in order to reject or defer the 
appropriations bill. See CONSULTATIVE GRP. ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 117, 
at 12-13. This can be contrasted with the view expressed at the Convention that this was “a 
new-fangled proposition, entirely un-English, and utterly opposed to the development of 
constitutional government.” AUSTRALASIAN CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 116, at 320 
(quoting Sir Henry Parkes). 
128 See Winterton, supra note 106, at 229, 237 (pointing out the government’s proclaimed 
need to uphold the principle of responsible government, whereby the entitlement to govern 
is supported by the confidence of the House of Representatives alone). 
129 Gareth Evans, The Senate’s Rights Can Be Wrong, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 29, 1975, at 11. 
130 Id. (citing the unsuccessful attempt to block the budget by the Legislative Council, the 
upper house of the legislature of Victoria, in 1877, and another blockage by the upper house 
in Victoria, which in fact did result in an election, in 1947). 
131 Whitlam would probably have breached the constitution at the point at which he 
began to spend money without parliamentary approval. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 83 
(“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the Commonwealth except under 
appropriation made by law.”); see also id. s 81 (establishing the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund). For contending views on its legality, see Winterton, supra note 106, at 238. Contra 
SAWER, supra note 102, at 162. 
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majority of one vote on October 16, October 22, and November 6, 1975.132 
And by November 11, 1975 – when it was estimated that the government 
would have sixteen days left to run before the money ran out – the Governor-
General Sir John Kerr took matters into his own hands.133 On the basis that Mr. 
Whitlam could not guarantee the running of government, Kerr dismissed the 
Prime Minister and appointed Opposition Leader Malcolm Fraser as caretaker 
to pass the financial legislation. Kerr did so in purported exercise of his 
constitutional powers,134 defending what he termed “a democratic and 
constitutional solution to the current crisis which will permit the people of 
Australia to decide as soon as possible what should be the outcome of the 
deadlock.”135 He then dissolved both Houses under section 57 of the 
constitution, under conditions met by other deadlocked legislation, and at the 
election in December, the Australian Labor Party was defeated in both Houses, 
and a Liberal-National Country Party coalition came to power.136 
The 1975 crisis is rightly famous – or notorious – for this drastic end result. 
The galling insult of an unelected Governor-General dismissing an elected 
Prime Minister is said to have galvanized the movement to dispense with 
monarchy in Australia137 (the movement is as yet unsuccessful, in part due to 
distrust of the presidential powers that any successor to the Governor-General 
would enjoy in the new republic).138 Such action was unprecedented: the 
 
132 Winterton, supra note 106, at 236. The delayed appropriations bills amounted to 
about one-eighth of the monthly formation of gross domestic product. KELLY, supra note 
112, at 176. For its potential implications on the economy in general, and particular sectors, 
see id. at 153. 
133 It is worth noting the supporting advice issued by a Liberal member of Parliament and 
former Commonwealth Solicitor-General, Robert Ellicott, and supported by the Chief 
Justice Sir Garfield Barwick, who Kerr had consulted without the Prime Minister’s 
approval. See Winterton, supra note 106, at 237. 
134 See Letter from Sir John R. Kerr, Governor-Gen., Austl., to Gough Whitlam, Prime 
Minister, Austl. (Nov. 11, 1975), reprinted in Current Topics, supra note 121, at 646. 
135 Kerr, supra note 121, at 646. 
136 The election resulted in fact in a landslide win for the Liberal-National Country Party 
coalition. Malcolm Mackerras, Double Dissolution Election, 1975: Results, in AUSTRALIAN 
POLITICS: A FOURTH READER, supra note 129, at 528, 528 tbl.2. This was despite the fact 
that, during the blockage itself, polls pointed to majority of support (70.4%) for the Senate 
passing supply; and polls taken on November 1–2 and 8–9 showed that sixty-seven percent 
were opposed to a rejection and sixty-three percent to a deferral of the Budget. Henry 
Mayer, Issues in the Polls, 1975 Election: A Preliminary Sketch, in AUSTRALIAN POLITICS: 
A FOURTH READER, supra note 129, at 525, 527. 
137 Winterton, supra note 106, at 252 (“[T]he most significant legacy of the Dismissal 
has been the growth of republicanism.”). But see MARK MCKENNA, THE CAPTIVE REPUBLIC: 
A HISTORY OF REPUBLICANISM IN AUSTRALIA 1788-1996, at 241-43 (1996) (disputing the 
influence of 1975 on any movement, or lack thereof, toward republicanism). 
138 On November 6, 1999, Australians rejected a proposed amendment of the constitution 
that would establish the Commonwealth of Australia as a republic. For an analysis of the 
legal, rather than identity-based, obstacles to the republic, see Brendan Lim, Crisis and the 
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Crown had last dismissed a (British) Prime Minister under King George III in 
1783.139 Although Kerr’s actions were supported in some quarters,140 the more 
general opprobrium that Whitlam’s dismissal attracted has ensured every 
Governor-General since that time has maintained a carefully ceremonial, rather 
than interventionist, role.141 More recent criticisms focus on the way the 
Governor-General deployed his powers, rather than their existence.142 Notably 
Kerr acted both prematurely and in questionable good faith, by “fail[ing] to 
warn Whitlam that he [would] face dismissal if he did not resign or advise a 
dissolution of Parliament by a specified date,”143 and by exercising his reserve 
powers when a political solution might still have been found.144 
But the backstory of deadlock is an important, if less recognized, part of this 
legacy. There were political causes of the crisis, to be sure, but the 
constitutional system also shaped the political choices available to voters. The 
different party alignment in the two houses was more likely because of the 
different electoral procedures and staggered intervals designed for each: the 
latter feature also prominent in the United States electoral system.145 Indeed, 
 
Canon: Australia’s Constitution After Whitlam (Sept. 2013) (unpublished J.S.D. 
dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author). 
139 This occurred in the dismissal of Lord North. See Colin Howard & Cheryl Saunders, 
The Blocking of the Budget and the Dismissal of the Government, in LABOR AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 1972-1975, supra note 108, at 272, 272 (recounting the difficulty in finding 
English precedent for the Governor-General’s actions and recounting other occurrences such 
as the resignation of Prime Minister Peel under Queen Victoria in 1839, and the exchanges 
between William IV and Lord Melbourne in 1834). For a description of the inevitable loss 
or yielding of monarch powers over time, see Adam Przeworski et al., The Origins of 
Parliamentary Responsibility, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 101, 107 (Tom 
Ginsburg ed., 2012). 
140 See, e.g., R.J. Ellicott, Commentaries, in LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTION: 1972-1975, 
supra note 108, at 288, 288-96. 
141 JOHN HIRST, A REPUBLICAN MANIFESTO 64-72 (1994). 
142 See SAWER, supra note 102, at 150. 
143 Winterton, supra note 106, at 248. 
144 See id. at 247-48. For the view that a Prime Minister may be entitled to a fair hearing 
prior to dismissal, see SAWER, supra note 102, at 148. 
145 Unlike the maximum terms of approximately three years that members of the House 
of Representatives serve, the Australian Senate enjoys fixed six-year terms with half retiring 
every three years. See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 7. At federation there were six senators 
for each state; now there are twelve, including Tasmania, which still has only five members 
in the House of Representatives. See id. s 7; Representation Act 1983 (Cth) s 3. In contrast, 
the members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate serve terms of two and six 
years respectively. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. The differences in 
composition between the House of Representatives and the Australian Senate have been 
exacerbated by the formal equality of states, so that citizens of underpopulated states enjoy 
far greater access to the Senate. “The vote of a Queenslander is worth twice as much as that 
of a Victorian or a New South Welshman, that of a WA nearly four times as much, and that 
of a Tasmanian nearly ten times as much.” Evans, supra note 129, at 544. For a critique of 
  
2014] GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWNS 1015 
 
the government of the day has not enjoyed a majority in the Australian Senate 
for the majority of its constitutional life,146 an effect exacerbated by the 
electoral system of proportional representation (within states) in place in the 
Senate since 1948,147 against the preferential, single-winner system that sends 
members to the House of Representatives. Members of the two chambers now 
report to very different constituencies, making disagreement more likely, and 
giving the same political parties distinctive political leverage in each.148 Again 
like the United States this is compounded by the fact that the two chambers 
enjoy equal powers (except to a limited extent dealing with financial matters), 
which makes rival claims of representative mandates potentially unresolvable. 
In both the United States and Australia, deadlock is intrinsically connected 
to the separation of powers principle and compounded by the notion of checks 
and balances. Although the architecture of presidentialism and 
parliamentarianism divides these systems, as well as other relevant 
differences,149 the principle of separation of powers is shared through the 
institution of bicameralism.150 Moreover, presidentialism and bicamerialism 
have in common the characteristic of veto players in decisionmaking.151 And if 
bicameralism has “an implicit supermajoritarian effect,”152 its application to 
money bills makes recourse to shutdown less inconceivable than one would 
 
the U.S. disparities in the Senate, see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN 
CORRECT IT) 29, 51-62 (2006) (discussing the “equal voting power [given] to Wyoming and 
California alike,” id. at 29). 
146 See CONSULTATIVE GRP. ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 117, at 14 (“As the 
then Leader of the Opposition, the Hon Simon Crean MP, observed in parliament on 8 
October 2003, for 37 of the last 42 years the government of the day has not had a majority in 
the Senate.”). 
147 Id. at 13 (“Governments have invoked the [antideadlock clause of section 57] on six 
occasions, five of them occurring since the introduction of proportional representation for 
the election of senators in 1948.”). 
148 Recently, the Senate has housed a greater number of independents and 
“microparties,” in part because of electoral rules quite unlike other proportional 
representation systems. Antony Green, Senate Preference Deals Put the Joke on Us, AGE 
(Austl.) (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.theage.com.au/comment/senate-preference-deals-put-
the-joke-on-us-20130909-2tg64.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WXL4-MDJX 
(documenting the preference deals between parties that have resulted in the election of 
parties with less than 0.5% of the vote). 
149 Most obviously, the Australian Constitution lacks a Bill of Rights, although it does 
contain certain guarantees. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 80 (trial by jury); id. s 90 
(freedom of interstate trade and commerce); id. s 116 (religious freedom); id. s 117 
(residents’ rights against other state discrimination). 
150 That bicameralism and the separation of powers can be defended on similar grounds, 
see Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Constitutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV. 1435, 
1436-37 (2011). 
151 Tsebelis, supra note 71, at 292. 
152 Vermeule, supra note 150, at 1470. 
  
1016 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:991 
 
expect.153 Thus it is no surprise that the bicameral deadlock that attenuates U.S 
congressional gridlock was also experienced in Australia. This feature 
complicates any prescription of parliamentarianism as a response to 
presidentialist impasse, especially in federal systems.154 
Nonetheless while some causes of deadlock might be comparable in 
Australia and the United States, the solutions are not. In Australia such 
problems could be avoided by the simple removal of the Senate’s supply 
blocking power,155 or by constitutional or legislative measures that would 
permit the government to continue to spend money at the previously approved 
level until the impasse has ended,156 or alternatively a demotion of the “checks 
and balances” principle in the Senate system.157 Although the first institutional 
alternative is not politically viable for federal constitutional reform in 
Australia,158 the automatic passage of supply through the upper house has been 
institutionalized in certain bicameral Australian state parliaments.159 This 
default option appears to favor government functionality over the (other) 
virtues of bicameralism,160 at least where appropriations are at risk. In the 
United States, however, the removal of Senate involvement in the passage of 
appropriations would not have forestalled the impasse of October 2013, when 
blockage came from the (more polarized) House.161 A default rule like that 
 
153 Consider the dysfunction attributed to the supermajority rules (requiring two-thirds 
majority in both houses) for California’s budget legislation and its taxation increase 
legislation. See Levinson, supra note 40, at 1265. 
154 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
150-51 (Dover Publications, Inc., 2006) (1886). In registering support for a constrained 
separation, Professor Ackerman acknowledges the “cautionary tale” of Australia in 1975. 
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 674 (2000). 
155 See generally CONSULTATIVE GRP. ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 117, at 
18 (commenting that the submission of the Australian Labor Party that policy proposals to 
resolve parliamentary deadlock “should be accompanied by the removal of the power of the 
Senate to block supply and the introduction of fixed four year terms for both houses”). 
156 Nicholas Aroney, Four Reasons for an Upper House: Representative Democracy, 
Public Deliberation, Legislative Outputs and Executive Accountability, 29 ADELAIDE L. 
REV. 205, 231-32 (2008). 
157 See SAWER, supra note 102, at 191. 
158 See CONSULTATIVE GRP. ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 117, at 8 (finding 
“no reasonable prospect of gaining sufficient community support for either of the options 
for change advanced in the discussion paper to warrant the holding of a referendum”). The 
issue has been considered on four separate occasions between 1950 and 1988. Id. at 5. 
159 The New South Wales and Victorian Constitutions allow an appropriations bill to be 
deemed to have passed after one month. Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) s 5A; Constitution 
Act 1975 (Vic) s 65. 
160 See TSEBELIS & MONEY, supra note 75, at 16 (acknowledging that bicameralism has 
efficiency advantages when both houses have common interests, but political disadvantages 
when the houses have competing interests); Vermeule, supra note 150, at 1466. 
161 For accounts as to why the House, rather than the Senate, exacts more polarization, 
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seen in other presidential systems would thus be a more effective solution for 
confronting American congressional impasse overall. Nonetheless a rethinking 
of the “checks and balances” principle, and its supplementation with the more 
active responsibilities of Congress, may also be relevant, as is outlined 
below.162 
Turning back to the substance behind the shutdown in the United States, it is 
worth pausing on the healthcare (and other social welfare) controversies 
behind the 1975 deadlock in Australia, and the 2013 deadlock in the United 
States.163 While the comparative parallels are striking, they do not necessarily 
prove an ideological bias in the use of the threat of shutdown. Nonetheless, 
U.S. trends alone suggest that, in this country at least, the more conservative 
party has a higher tolerance of financial impasse. It is no coincidence that the 
most noteworthy examples of government shutdowns have occurred when 
Democrats controlled the executive branch and Republicans controlled at least 
one legislative chamber.164 Moreover, the introduction of a universal system of 
health insurance has flared powerful political sentiments in the United States, 
just as it did in Australia in 1973. Polarized parties – and a polarized polity – 
existed in each. 
In the story of financial impasses in the United States and Australia, 
polarization is both a driver and an effect.165 It has many causes, and 
constitutional lawyers are good at emphasizing the institutional ones.166 But 
when political scientists seek to identify causes of polarization, many 
 
see Pildes, supra note 40, at 323-24. 
162 See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in 
an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011) (arguing that a system of prods and 
pleas is just as vital as checks and balances). For an opposing emphasis on the importance of 
checks, by limited government, in the context of appropriations, see Kate Stith, Congress’ 
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1348 (1988). 
163 Arguably, the issue of healthcare entitlements and funding was at the heart of the 
1995–1996 U.S. government shutdown, as well. See Tiefer, supra note 14; cf. 
Krishnakumar, supra note 61, at 590. 
164 See Memorandum from Jessica Tollestrup, Co-Coordinator, Analyst on Cong. & the 
Legislative Process, Cong. Research Serv., Jared Nagel, Co-Coordinator, Info. Research 
Specialist, Cong. Research Serv. (Oct. 7, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/KL8F-CSJM 
(discussing the causes of previous U.S. government shutdowns). 
165 Cf. Yasmin Dawood, Democratic Dysfunction and Constitutional Design, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 913, 930-35 (2014) (suggesting that the same political and institutional features in a 
parliamentary democracy would not likely cause government dysfunction because of the 
differences in the decisionmaking process). Professor Dawood is right if we focus on the 
return to stability in Australian politics after the 1975 crisis and discount its negative effect 
on political morality. For a summary of the latter prognosis, see Winterton, supra note 106, 
at 251. This may also be true of the United States. 
166 For an expansive study that emphasizes institutional, but also historical and 
personality-driven factors, see Pildes, supra note 40, at 297-325 (observing the design of 
primaries, electoral districts, and internal House and Senate rules, as significant causes of 
polarization). 
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emphasize the powerful and even dominant role of the economic inequality 
variable.167 If this hypothesis is true, then interventions to end inequality – and 
end polarization – may be stymied by the very forces that they are trying to 
confront. The introduction of equalizing measures may simply generate more 
shutdowns, and one might forecast an ever-increasing threat and use of 
budgetary impasse in coming years.168 Such a result adds further complexity to 
the three design options – of default passage, representation, or silence – that I 
now turn to evaluate. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL IMPASSE: THREE FRAMES 
The comparisons presented in this Article reveal three frames under which 
one may understand the constitutional resolution of financial impasse: a 
constitutional default rule that automatically passes contentious budgetary 
legislation; a prorepresentative procedure available to the government and/or 
an independent arbiter that turns to election; and the alternative constitutional 
silence and toleration of deadlock, with the expectation of political resolution. 
The frames are not exhaustive – for example, some constitutions exceptionally 
provide for judicial resolution.169 Moreover the frames tell us little in isolation 
about the ways other aspects of constitutional design might increase (or 
decrease) the likelihood of polarization and deadlock, through, for example, 
sustaining or creating perversities in electoral design, or intransigence in 
legislative processes. Nonetheless, these three alternatives allow us to expand 
beyond mere presidential/parliamentary comparisons, and press us to examine 
the assumptions behind the current U.S. model. 
It is worth pausing on the distinctive virtues of and problems posed by each 
frame, which provide a useful outline for empirical testing. The first frame, the 
default rule, takes from Congress the opportunity to make conditions or threats 
to the passage or operation of specific legislation on the basis of withholding 
support for the budget. This rule is widely used in presidential systems outside 
of the United States, and in resolving bicameral conflicts in nations with 
 
167 See NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND 
UNEQUAL RICHES 71-113 (2006) (finding that between 1956 and 1996 partisanship became 
more stratified by income); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: 
UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 232, 259 
(2012). But see Pildes, supra note 40, at 295-97 (endorsing the importance of the McCarty 
et al. thesis, but questioning its application after the 2008 presidential election). 
168 Gamage & Louk, supra note 62, at 4 (“The key aspects of the new fiscal politics 
include: the rise of conservative anti-tax sentiment; increasing party polarization; more safe 
and gerrymandered districts and fewer moderate legislators; and a voting public 
characterized by often-contradictory and asymmetric preferences about fiscal policy.”). For 
responses to polarization, see infra Part IV; infra notes 183-92 and accompanying text. 
169 For example, the recent constitution of Congo, drafted by a range of international 
experts, exceptionally refers a failure to pass budgetary legislation to the Constitutional 
Court if an extraordinary session does not resolve the deadlock within fifteen days. 
CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU CONGO art. 127. 
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parliamentary constitutions, and has the advantage of automatic application. It 
therefore has the potential to stand above the political winds of the day in order 
to ensure that general government services, which may be critical to different 
constituencies and unrelated to current disagreements, are not held hostage to 
political maneuvering. While there remain other ways for Congress to express 
its disapproval with specific legislation, such as its refusal to pass that 
legislation, the threat of subsequent government shutdown is not one of them. 
Such an option does not inevitably threaten the other agenda setting, 
deliberative, scrutiny, and resolution-seeking tasks of the legislature. 
This option is neither foreign nor new to the United States.170 In 1997, for 
example, the 105th Congress supported a default rule in the form of automatic 
continuing resolutions for supplemental appropriations for the 1997 fiscal year. 
The provision was initially capped at ninety-eight percent, then increased to 
100% of the prior year’s funding level, and was passed by both the House and 
the Senate on June 5, 1997. President Clinton, however, vetoed the legislation 
on June 9, 1997, with an objection that the funding levels would be eighteen 
billion dollars below levels contained in an earlier agreement.171 Later, in 
1999, the 106th Congress considered a permanent automatic continuing 
resolution proposal, which would have provided funding at the prior year’s 
level.172 The House proposal was sponsored by a bipartisan coalition of 
members, but failed to pass.173 The Senate proposal was accompanied by a 
joint hearing.174 This proposal was considered along with a two-year budgetary 
cycle, and, if passed, would have continued the funding for government 
services in the event that legislators were unable to reach a compromise, yet at 
a lower level.175 This, too, failed to pass. 
Nonetheless, U.S. states – which are themselves no strangers to government 
shutdowns176 – also represent a partial embrace of default budget procedures. 
 
170 Indeed, since the late 1980s, Republican Representative George Gekas of 
Pennsylvania regularly introduced a bill that would provide a default federal budget if no 
budget were enacted by September 30. See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 18,896 (July 24, 1996) 
(statement of Rep. Gekas). 
171 ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30339, PREVENTING FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWNS: PROPOSALS FOR AN AUTOMATIC CONTINUING RESOLUTION 8 
(2000), archived at http://perma.cc/3HZ4-CZMJ. 
172 Revenue Raising Proposals in the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 106th Cong. 106-24 (1999). 
173 Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 853, 106th Cong. (1999); 
see KEITH, supra note 171, at 10. 
174 S. REP. NO. 106-15 (1999); see KEITH, supra note 171, at 10. 
175 S. REP. NO. 106-15, at 2 (1999). 
176 Gamage & Louk, supra note 62, at 32-37 (detailing budget crises in California 
between 2008 and 2012 and the government shutdown in Minnesota); see Late State 
Budgets, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/fiscal-policy/late-state-budgets.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/4GSG-VMSQ 
(documenting Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee as the five 
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For example, both Wisconsin and Rhode Island have partial default budget 
procedures, which allow an automatic budget to pass in the event of 
negotiation failure.177 Contrary to the concerns that the absence of a significant 
threat of government shutdown may make compromise harder to achieve, 
David Gamage and David Louk report that these procedures have not resulted 
in significantly delayed budgets, nor in the chronic long-term implementation 
of default budgets.178 While one should not read too much into the U.S. state 
comparisons, the fact that as many as twelve state constitutions contain a form 
of default unsettles the claim to exceptionalism of U.S shutdown experience to 
a degree.179 Moreover, their existence suggests, as do other national 
constitutions, that the oft-cited drawbacks of the default option may require 
further examination. 
Nonetheless, insofar as deadlock might result between the Congress and the 
President (in presidential systems), or between chambers (in both presidential 
and parliamentary systems), such a default rule arguably transfers significant 
power to the President or Prime Minister in systems that already contain many 
deferrals to executive rule. While I argue that there is something distinctive 
about financial legislation as compared to other examples of interchamber and 
interbranch back-and-forth, there is no doubt that legislative control over the 
budget remains an important way to limit the executive.180 The legislature’s 
ability to refuse supply without any other assurance of government functioning 
might indeed be considered too venerable a principle of constitutionalism to 
reform.181 Empirical research is needed on how comparative legislatures are 
nevertheless able to participate in systems with the default rules of passage 
described above – how they retain their quintessential “power of the purse” 
 
states that have experienced partial government shutdowns since 2002). 
177 Gamage & Louk, supra note 62, at 46-48. Research by the National Conference of 
State Legislatures suggests that twelve states have constitutional provisions to allow for the 
continuous operation of budget. Late State Budgets, supra note 176. 
178 Gamage & Louk, supra note 62, at 51. 
179 Late State Budgets, supra note 176 (observing twelve examples, as well as the more 
general problem of late budgets for state legislatures). For an analysis of the similarities of 
U.S. state constitutions and national constitutions elsewhere, see Mila Versteeg & Emily 
Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2416300. 
180 For critique of executive power as the most poignant failure of separation of powers 
theory, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 67 
(2010). 
181 E.g., Winterton, supra note 106, at 244 (“The ultimate power of Parliament to control 
the executive by denying it money . . . is a much older principle of British constitutionalism 
than responsible government.”); see also AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 83; U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 9, cl. 7; Stith, supra note 162, at 1344 (“Among the duties—and among the rights, too—
of this House, there is perhaps none so important as the control which it constitutionally 
possesses over the public purse.” (quoting 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 1330 (1809) (remarks of 
Rep. J. Randolph)). 
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when they no longer enjoy the ability to manage the purse as a real-time threat 
to government functioning. This may uncover important internal rules for 
legislative committees, other budget processes, or indeed background 
interactions among broader institutions, that support legislative participation in 
financial decisionmaking without a veto power. We might call for the design of 
other “compromise-forcing devices” in budgetary negotiations; if they are, in 
fact, considered necessary.182 
There are other questions to consider in this first option of default passage. 
For example, there are significant differences in a default rule that 
automatically passes the previous year’s budget, and one that guarantees 
passage of the current proposal.183 The former heightens the pressure against 
fiscal increases and can thus defund an important part of a government’s 
agenda, especially one that seeks to increase spending.184 If there is an election 
in between the previous budget and the present proposal, and the earlier budget 
belongs to a different government with different political preferences, the 
problem may become more acute. Default budgets may also misallocate 
resources simply by virtue of changing circumstances, thus affecting voters 
and interest groups further.185 This may be remedied by a predetermined 
formula for adjustment,186 yet it might be impossible to design such a formula 
without giving a structural advantage to the tax and spending preferences of 
either Republicans or Democrats.187 And the prospect that every budget may 
become a future default might increase the difficulties of budgetary 
negotiations. Of course all of these potential problems with the default rule of 
passage of budget – especially the problem of transfer of power to the 
executive – must be weighed against those that arise from deadlock itself.188 
 
182 Gamage & Louk, supra note 62, at 50-51. 
183 See supra notes 76-82, 86, 95-97. Compare CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA 
DE PANAMA [C.P.] art. 273 (requiring that the preceding year’s budget will automatically 
take effect if no consensus is reached), with CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE 
CHILE [C.P.] art. 67 (requiring that the budget proposed by the lower house will take effect if 
no consensus is reached). 
184 In this way, there may be useful comparisons between such a default rule of passage 
and the proposed constitutional requirement for a balanced budget. For commentary on the 
latter, see, for example, LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION 55-69 (2007). 
185 Gamage & Louk, supra note 62, at 51. 
186 David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility 
Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749 (2010) (discussing options to balance default budgets). 
187 Gamage & Louk, supra note 62, at 49 n.204 (“[A] default budget could, for example, 
both raise taxes (which would be unpopular with conservatives) and cut social spending 
(likely unpopular with liberals).”). The failure to pass automatic continuing resolutions 
would suggest that disagreement on the default may be the decisive objection. See KEITH, 
supra note 171. 
188 Thus the pressure to act outside of a deadlocked Congress produces its own 
opportunities for transfer of power to the executive. See Linz, supra note 67, at 53. Closer to 
home, even recent comments by President Obama reflect such possibility. See President 
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The second, prorepresentative, solution has the advantage of returning any 
stalemate immediately to the people. For example, this solution has governed 
budgetary negotiations in Israel since 2003 (and it may be a signal in favor of 
this option that the refusal of a budget – and hence an early election – has not 
yet resulted).189 Yet the prorepresentative option is complicated by 
bicameralism, as it goes beyond the vote-of-no-confidence procedure familiar 
to parliamentary systems. The “aberrational”190 events in Australia in 1975 
suggest that financial impasse may lead to an automatic election upon the 
request by the Prime Minister, if certain conditions are met, or upon the 
unilateral decision of the Governor-General.191 Such a drastic option may 
apply a significant disciplining effect on the members of a warring legislature 
(both incumbents and opposition members), who may be reluctant to accept 
the political risk that their actions will be reprimanded by a negative vote at the 
polls. In contemporary Australian politics, the refusal of supply is now 
described as “political insanity.”192 
But the prorepresentative option also has its drawbacks. As a blanket 
transplant, it is inapt for presidentialist systems, like that in the United States, 
or other parliamentarian systems that have fixed election schedules. 
Nonetheless, some parliamentary systems have devised special procedures to 
work together fixed terms and early elections.193 From another perspective, the 
idea that the election is “representative” of the people is a complicated one. In 
Australia’s case, for example, the elections that have followed double 
dissolutions have not been fought on the basis of the bills that have triggered 
the deadlock.194 Moreover, insofar as the choice to turn to election is to be 
 
Barack Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 
2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 50, at 2 (Jan. 28, 2014) (stating in response to congressional 
obstruction that “America does not stand still, and neither will I. So wherever and whenever 
I can take steps without legislation to expand opportunity for more Americans families, that 
is what I am going to do”). 
189 Section 36A of Basic Law: The Knesset, was passed on Mar. 18, 2001 and came into 
effect on Feb. 28 2003. See Section 36A Amendment to the Basic Law, 5761–2001, SH No. 
1780 p. 166 (Isr.). Nonetheless, budgetary brinksmanship has not been avoided. See 
Jonathon Lis, Knesset Passes Contentious Budget, After Netanyahu Reaches Deal with 
Opposition, HAARETZ (July 29, 2013, 8:45 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.5 
38623, archived at http://perma.cc/6GG4-6ZLU. 
190 I use this word advisedly. Cf. Lim, supra note 138, at 7. 
191 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 57. 
192 Winterton, supra note 106, at 251. 
193 Many parliamentary systems with fixed election terms, such as Canada, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the Australian states of Victoria and New South Wales do, however, 
allow for an early election if the government loses the confidence of the House; others, such 
as Switzerland, cannot remove the executive government in mid term. See ANDREW 
REYNOLDS ET AL., INT’L INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 129-30 (2005). 
194 For a presentation of this history in Australia, see CONSULTATIVE GRP. ON 
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made by an electorally strong executive, this option would still result in the 
transfer of power to that branch, as in the default option.195 Insofar as the 
choice to turn to election is made by an independent arbiter, such as a 
Governor-General (or conceivably a different head of state or other appointed 
Commission196), the Australian case study indicates that the polarization – or 
perhaps the political opportunism197 – that is affecting the political parties may 
also affect the arbiter, and that such a significant “countermajoritarian,” but 
“prorepresentative” power may never be above disrepute. 
The third option, constitutional silence on what occurs in the event of 
financial deadlock is, of course, the situation in America. Constitutional silence 
implies a political resolution only. For example, we know there were political 
causes of the 2013 government shutdown, and that there was a political 
resolution when the shutdown ended, and ultimately – if the GOP suffers at the 
polls for its decision to obstruct – there will be a political solution to guard 
against a repeat. Nonetheless, the political consequences of failed budgetary 
negotiations may be insufficient – or too indeterminate – to limit the costs of 
shutdown, which may be considerable. As well as the individuals that rely on 
the suspended services deemed inessential, and the government employees 
who are furloughed, the threat and/or occurrence of government shutdowns 
creates fiscal uncertainty that harms the public at large. As the consequences of 
the 2013 shutdown make clear, instability in government taxing and spending 
can undermine investor confidence, economic growth, America’s reputation 
abroad, and the public’s trust in government more generally.198 
Such a result makes more urgent the requirement of other, more indirect 
measures to prevent financial impasse under conditions of constitutional 
silence. These reflect the more general options that exist to prevent deadlock in 
government. There are constitutional structures that can be tweaked to dampen 
the ideational polarization that creates and entrenches such problems. These 
would include changes to partisan gerrymandering, or at least partisan 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 117, at 14. 
195 An alternative proposal, preferred by then-Prime Minister John Howard in 2004, that 
deadlocks should trigger a joint sitting without election, looks even more like a default rule. 
See id. at 4. 
196 This Article does not explore the parallels with semipresidential systems, such as that 
in France, where the president has no direct responsibility to the Parliament, and significant 
powers, and yet the cabinet is still responsible to Parliament. For the implications of these 
systems in Australia, see Winterton, supra note 106, at 247. 
197 See Cartoon by Tandberg, reprinted in Winterton, supra note 106, at 230. The cartoon 
includes the following exchange between Sir John R. Kerr and Opposition Leader Malcolm 
Fraser: 
Kerr: If he stays we both go. 
Fraser: If he goes we both stay. 
Kerr: My decision will be what’s best for the majority. 
Id. 
198 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8. 
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districting, which is said to favor extremist candidates, and other procedural 
reforms.199 More broadly conceived reforms would include changes to civic 
education and broadcasting,200 and finding ways to overcome the democratic 
distortions created by the way we finance and conduct campaigning,201 and 
how we construct opinion polls.202 Small-scale reforms to the budget process, 
such as delaying disclosure in the earliest stages of negotiations, and 
maximizing publicity in the latter stages, might also promote agreement, and 
bring with it other advantages.203 But, more intrinsically, the prevention of 
deadlock would also include the reassertion of the idea that the legislature has 
a duty to actively govern, and not just to provide checks and balances on 
power.204 This implies a duty to compromise before the shuttering of 
government. At least this latter proposal need not be a capital “C” 
constitutional amendment, but rather a small “c” change in American 
governance.205 
CONCLUSION 
The space in which American exceptionalism joins American 
constitutionalism is both large and contested. It usually lies at the junctures of 
where the constitution meets foreign policy, or where it meets social policy. At 
the first juncture, America retains the paradox of both leadership and outlier 
status in international law and the globalization of constitutional law.206 At the 
 
199 See LEVINSON, supra note 145, at 29 (asserting that partisan gerrymandering is “a true 
disease, threatening the very notion of representative democracy”); Stephen Macedo, 
Toward a More Democratic Congress? Our Imperfect Democratic Constitution: The Critics 
Examined, 89 B.U. L. REV. 609, 621-23 (2009) (acknowledging the effect of partisan 
districting, but attributing polarization to party realignment and demographics). 
200 See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? 129 (2006). 
201 See WOLFE, supra note 51, at 80, 92; Pildes, supra note 40, at 326. 
202 Compare a counterproposal from the current practice of deferring to unreflective 
polls. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND 
PUBLIC CONSULTATION 14-15 (2011). 
203 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 194-205 (2007) (stating the 
advantages for accountability, bargaining, and the defeat of the “bridges to nowhere” 
problem of budgetary compromises). The disclosure of the earliest stages should be made, 
Vermeule suggests, before Election Day. Id. at 206. 
204 See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 162, at 350; Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, 
Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 148, 148 (2007), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/political-avoidance-constitutional-theory-and-the-vra 
(“[T]he flight from political responsibility – the problem of political abdication – is at least 
as serious a threat [as tyranny].”); Waldron, supra note 63, at 460 (“Instead the legislature 
should do its kind of work – legislative work . . . .”). 
205 It is worth noting that to designate a principle as constitutional is neither to imply that 
courts must be the interpreters or enforcers of the principle, nor that written text must be its 
sole repository. For application to the fiscal context, see Dam, supra note 98, at 294. 
206 See Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, in 
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second juncture, America represents a distinctively venerable democracy, but 
one which fails to make good on social guarantees considered unremarkable – 
indeed central – to the commitments of other advanced democracies.207 These 
aspects of constitutional exceptionalism, presented in this Article as a problem 
to examine, rather than as an ideology to dispel,208 cast an important light on 
the contemporary experience of government shutdowns in the United States, 
including their constitutionality, tolerance and increasing occurrence. 
In bringing a comparative perspective to the phenomenon of government 
shutdowns, this Article indicates the uniqueness that is part of this aspect of 
American’s constitutional experience. Funding gaps, or the shuttering of 
government services after a failure to agree on the budget, are avoided 
elsewhere, through constitutional design and through the cultural commitments 
that makes such designs operational. In examining both presidential and 
parliamentary systems, and in focusing on the veto elements of the separated 
branches of presidentialism and the separated chambers of bicameralism that 
make impasse more likely, this Article suggests three frames from which to 
approach the resolution of budgetary impasse. These are important in 
understanding how the costs of financial impasse can be prevented. I suggest 
that these costs are qualitatively different from other forms of legislative 
gridlock, which may simply leave the status quo in place,209 rather than 
actively shuttering government and placing an immediate burden on already 
vulnerable and politically weak groups. A failure to pass appropriations, even 
when entitlements are secure, may also have a larger impact on the fiscal 
stability of the government, and the trust of the larger public in it, than failures 
to pass other forms of legislation. 
 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 46, at 1 (describing practices 
of U.S. exceptionalism in foreign policy, double standards in human rights, and judicial 
isolationism); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012) (inferring declining constitutional influence 
from an analysis of textual difference). 
207 Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining 
America Away, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663 (2008); Moravcsik, supra note 49, at 164-65. For 
an attempt to reduce the space deemed exceptionalist, by reference to the textual parallels 
between U.S. state constitutions and other national constitutions, see Stephen Gardbaum, 
The Myth and the Reality of American Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 446-53 
(2008); Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 179. 
208 Dorothy Ross, American Exceptionalism, in A COMPANION TO AMERICAN THOUGHT 
22, 22 (Richard Wightman Fox & James T. Kloppenberg eds., 1995) (distinguishing 
between American exceptionalism as an “edifying myth, as calculated mystification, and as 
chauvinism,” on the one hand, and as a “critical discussion of . . . difference,” on the other).  
209 Of course, the status quo may itself be costly. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Why 
Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2112 (2013) (“[G]ridlock might actually 
allow certain factions to preserve their privileged status as well as certain minorities to 
continue to be subjected to inequitable or unfair treatment.”). 
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In the first frame, the constitution may rule that default budgets must pass 
when proposed budgets have been stalled, in order to keep government 
services in place and government contracts in effect. These defaults differ in 
terms of whether the previous year’s budget, or the proposed budget, is passed. 
Further empirical work is needed to test the constraints that remain as part of 
legislative control on the appropriations power, and those that can continue to 
force compromise in the many constitutions – both presidentialist and 
parliamentarian – that have adopted this option. In the second frame, the 
constitution may outline the procedure for a prorepresentative solution, in the 
form of allowing for an early election to bring about a new balance of power 
(in either branch) and hence a new attempt to reach budgetary compromise. On 
its face, this solution would appear to give an extraordinary leverage power to 
an executive (or to a numerically majoritarian opposition in another branch or 
chamber). In presenting a closer case study of the Australian version of this 
option, this Article shows its implications in practice. In particular, a return to 
election may result in a constitutional crisis of such extreme scale, that its 
legacy may itself act to prevent negotiation failures for future budgets. It 
thereby shares the tools of political discipline, present in the third frame of 
constitutional silence. This frame, in which the constitution permits financial 
impasse, and relies on political resolution only to limit its use, is that which 
exists in the United States. As American experience has shown, however, the 
disciplining strength of politics is contingent. A polarized partisan politics, 
especially one in which the voter repercussions of government shutdowns may 
appear unequal to different parties, may point to a conclusion that political 
discipline can do little to avert financial impasse in fact. 
But the purpose of presenting these frames is not to draw conclusions about 
their pros and cons, or about what would ultimately be the best constitutional 
model for surmounting America’s current political problems. It is rather to 
remind us of the exceptionalism – indeed, marginality – of current U.S. 
congressional practices in relation to the delay of appropriations bills and the 
generation of government shutdowns. Admittedly this goal constrains the 
ambitions of comparative constitutional study and the active enterprise of 
comparative constitutional design and redesign. And it risks ceding to the 
obduracy of the amendment of the written U.S. Constitution the ability to think 
critically and diagnostically about the Constitution, constitutional practices, 
and broader legislative and administrative mechanisms of America’s own 
fiscal constitution. Constitutions come in many forms, and their texts reflect 
different aspects of their national history, especially as that (real and 
perceived) history has been translated through political culture, previous 
institutions, and the choices between what to preserve and what (and how) to 
transform. Comparative experience informs these choices, but is no less messy 
and ambiguous. A catalogue of written constitutional rules for the prevention 
of shutdowns – and a closer investigation of a single comparative practice in 
Australia’s parliamentary system – presents not only this ambiguity but also its 
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potential to help us rethink the range of responses to contemporary U.S. 
political dysfunction. 
 
